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Abstract 
This study uses a best Wworst scaling experiment to test whether general practitioners (GPs) act as perfect 
agents for the patients in the consultation; and if not, whether this is due to asymmetric information 
and/or other motivations than user orientation. Survey data was collected from 775 GPs and 1379 Danish 
citizens eliciting preferences for a consultation. Sequential models allowing for within-person preference 
heterogeneity and heteroskedasticity between best and worst choices were estimated. We show that GPs 
do not always act as perfect agents and that this non-alignment stems from GPs being both unable and 
ƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽĚŽƐŽ ?hŶĂďůĞƐŝŶĐĞ'WƐŚĂǀĞŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐ
since they are also motivated by other factors than user orientation. Our findings highlight the need for 
multi-pronged strategies targeting different motivational factors to ensure that GPs act in correspondence 
ǁŝƚŚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶĂƌĞĂƐǁŚĞƌĞĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚŝƐǁĂƌƌĂŶƚĞĚ ? 
 
Keywords: Agency theory, general practice, asymmetric information, user orientation, best Wworst scaling 
case 3  
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1. Introduction 
The patient Wdoctor relationship describes one of the cornerstones in the universal provision of health care 
services. Understanding and correct mapping of the relationship is important as it provides a basis for the 
design of efficient economic incentive schemes, and in the analysis of demand for and optimal delivery of 
health care services. This is especially true for primary care, as demonstrated by the substantial research 
within this area over the last decades including  W but not limited to  W research on remuneration systems 
and how they affect GP behavior (e.g., Gosden et al. 2000; Scott and Shiell 1997; van den Berg et al. 2009; 
Henning-Schmidt et al. 2011), 'WƐ ? ƌŽůĞƐ ĂƐ ŐĂƚĞŬĞĞƉĞƌƐ  ?e.g., Brekke et al. 2007; Dusheiko et al. 2006), 
supplier-induced demand (e.g., Dijk et al. 2013; Labelle et al. 1994), and patient moral hazard (e.g., Dijk, 
Berg, Verheij, Spreeuwenberg, Groenewegen, and Bakker 2013; Doran et al. 2005). During the last decades, 
this research has provided valuable input to health policy makers. Still, many issues remain unresolved 
including the influence of different motivational factors on GP behavior, and the GPs role in optimizing 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? pathways and in the delivery of patient-centered primary care services. 
The patient Wdoctor relationship deviates from the assumptions made in traditional agency theory on 
several well-known dimensions (see, e.g., Blomqvist 1991; Gafni et al. 1998; Mooney and Ryan 1993; Ryan 
1994; Scott 2000). First, the relationship is characterized by double-sided asymmetric information; that is, 
'WƐ ŚĂǀĞ ŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?behavior and preferences for treatment on 
one side, and patients have incomplete information on clinical diagnosis and treatment options on the 
other side. Second, the GP is assumed to take the utility of the patient into account when maximizing 
his/her own utility; that is, having a genuine concern for the welfare of the patient, thereby acting as an 
agent for the patient. This altruistic motivation has in the literature been referred to as  ?user orientation ? to 
signal ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ ĚŽŝng good for the individual recipient (the patient) as 
opposed to  ?ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ ĚŽŝŶŐ ŐŽŽĚ ĨŽƌ collective entities (all 
patients) (Vandenabeele 2008; Andersen et al. 2011;  Jensen and Andersen 2015). Accordingly, GPs 
can be considered double agents, meaning that they have to satisfy two principals  W the individual patient 
consulting the GP, and the health care authorities contracting with the GPs and representing the joint 
interest of all patients. Given this triangular nature of the agency relationship, it is likely that the interests 
of the GP and the individual patient are not always perfectly aligned. Thus, non-alignment could stem from 
ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ (that is, asymmetric information) and/or conflict between user 
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oriented motivation and other motivations such as personal financial incentives1, public service 
motivation2, and/or paternalism (e.g. focusing more narrowly on the patient ?s health benefits). 
Consequently, GPs are expected to make trade-offs between the individual and the collective interest 
which may cause GPs to refrain from acting as perfect agents for the patients in order to optimize scarce 
resources3. 
Inspired by the work of (among others) Cheraghi-Sohi et al. (2008) and Scott and Vick (1999), we set out to 
further investigate the GP Wpatient encounter by ƐƚƵĚǇŝŶŐ ďŽƚŚ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ 'WƐ ? ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ĨŽƌ
characteristics of a consultation using a stated preference (SP) methodology. With the application of a split 
questionnaire design, we also elicited 'WƐ ?ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐďǇĂƐŬŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŽĐŚŽŽƐĞ
the type of consultation they believe their typical patient would prefer. With this approach, we seek to 
identify the extent to which GPs are well-informed about ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ (whether there is any 
asymmetric information), and to what extent GPs refrain from being perfect agents for the patients. This 
enables us to answer the following three research questions: (1) Do GPs act as perfect agents for the 
patients (ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶŽĨ'WƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐǁŝƚŚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ? If not, is this due to (2) uncertainty 
ĂďŽƵƚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞasymmetric information between GPs and patients (comparison 
of 'WƐ ?ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐǁŝƚŚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ), and/or (3) deviations caused by 
other motivational factors than user orientation (comparison of 'WƐ ?ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ
ǁŝƚŚ'WƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ) ?dŚĂƚ'WƐ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĂůǁĂǇƐĐŽŶŐƌƵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚthe preferences of their individual 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ŝƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚĚƵĞƚŽ'WƐ ?ĚŽƵďůĞĂŐĞŶĐǇ ?dŚĂƚ'WƐĚŽŶŽƚĂůǁĂǇƐŬŶŽǁƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ŝƐŽĨ
more concern, since the presence of asymmetric information implies that GPs cannot act as perfect agents 
for their patients even in situations where they intend to do so. This potential problem is highly relevant in 
light of the widespread focus on patient satisfaction as an indicator of quality and the standard of services 
more broadly, and for the delivery of patient-centered care (Greenfield and Braithwaite 2008).  
WƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ ƵƐĞĚ ^W ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ƚŽ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?
preferences (e.g., Carlsen and Aakvik 2006; Payne et al. 2011; Van den Hombergh et al. 2005; Vedsted et al. 
                                                          
1 The literature has traditionally distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, where intrinsic motivation is 
defined as the doing of an activity for the enjoyment of the activity itself in contrast to extrinsic motivation where an 
activity is done in order to attain some separable outcome (that is, external reward) such as financial incentives 
(Benabou and Tirole 2003; Ryan and Deci 2000; Frey and Jegen 2001). 
2 According to Jacobsen et al. (2013), and in line with Ryan and Deci (2000), public service motivation can be seen as a 
type of internalized extrinsic motivation. 
3 By perfect agency we refer to a situation in which the GP works as a perfect agent for the patient thus making the 
same decision as the patient would, were the patient to be party to the same clinical expertise as the doctor. This also 
includes taking the ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽƐƚ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŝŵĞ ?ŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? 
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2002 ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐŽƚŚĞƌ^WƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŚĂǀĞĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐǁŝƚŚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ
preferences (e.g., Cox et al. 2007; Marshall et al. 2009; Mühlbacher and Nübling 2010; Neuman and 
Neuman 2009; Pedersen et al. 2012). Evidence on the ĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĚŽĐƚŽƌƐŬŶŽǁƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ
is mixed, as ĂƌĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƵƚŝůŝƚǇĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĂůŝŐŶĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨ
studies suggesting that differences exist. However, none of these studies are capable of identifying the 
extent to which possible discrepancies stem from doctors pursuing other goals than to satisfy patient 
preferences (such as financial incentives or public service motivation), or from asymmetric information 
between GPs and patients4. One way to explore the agency relationship in greater detail is to include all 
three perspectives (patient, GP, and GP perception) in one study. Although significant information can be 
obtained from such a setting, none of the aforementioned studies have attempted to do this. The present 
study fills this gab in the literature by providing a first attempt at a combined investigation of the agency 
relationship in general practice using a SP framework5. 
We use the agency model to study preferences for characteristics of a consultation not involving treatment 
decisions. Hence, clinical considerations on diagnosis and treatment are of less concern, implying that 
ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌǇŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĚƵĞƚŽƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ůĂĐŬŽĨĐůŝŶŝĐĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĐĂŶďĞĚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů(and 
acceptable) explanation for divergence in preferences. We survey a random sample of the Danish 
population and GPs and apply a best Wworst scaling case 3 (BW3) experiment (Lancsar et al. 2005; Louviere 
et al. 2015; Louviere et al. 2004; Marley and Louviere 2005; Marley and Pihlens 2012). The BW3 experiment 
is a SP approach and a variant of the more traditional choice experiment. In a BW3 experiment respondents 
are presented with a number of choice sets and are, in each choice set, asked to choose not only the best 
alternative (as in a traditional choice experiment) but also the worst alternative among those available. 
BW3 has received attention in the literature since it provides richer information on preferences compared 
to traditional choice experiments, due to the possible insights into the full preference ordering of 
respondents. BW3 is ideal in exploration of the agency relationship since more knowledge is obtained on 
the existence of possible discrepancies in preferences compared to, for example, traditional choice 
experiments. Hence, the method is useful in obtaining additional choice information and in providing a 
better understanding of the process of preference formation. Furthermore it enables us to gain knowledge 
on for which specific elements in the consultation the asymmetry in information exists, and on which 
                                                          
4 Other studies have focused on the trade-off between altruistic and financial incentives. This includes recent 
experimental research by Godager and Wiesen (2013), studying the degree of GPs altruism in choice of medical 
treatment. 
5 Only one study (Hirth et al. 2000) has previously attempted this approach, albeit with a specific policy focus and 
without analyzing the findings in the theoretical context of the agency relationship. 
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elements GPs deviate from acting as perfect agents for both best and worst choices. Our data is analyzed 
using a sequential best Wworst approach via a multinomial logit (MNL) specification that takes account of 
within-person heterogeneity and heteroskedasticity; that is, allowing for differences in scale and utility 
within best Wworst choices. To date, this approach has only been used in a few other studies (e.g., Scarpa et 
al. 2011; Louviere et al. 2015), and never in the area of health economics. Our results show that GPs 
ƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚůǇ ŬŶŽǁ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐwithin a consultation, but that asymmetric information exists 
ǁŚĞŶŝƚĐŽŵĞƐƚŽƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ŵŽƐƚƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚĂƐƉĞĐƚof the consultation, which involves discussions on their 
general health status and lifestyle. Furthermore, we find evidence that GPs are not solely user oriented and 
refrain from being perfect agents for the patients. This is the case, for instance, with respect to time 
allocated to explain the problem during the consultation. These results are robust to various specification 
checks.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the organizational 
context of general practice in Denmark, and describes our theoretical model on the agency relationship in 
general practice. Section 3 describes the survey design, data collection, statistical models, and hypotheses 
to be tested. In Section 4 results are presented and these are further discussed in section 5. Section 6 offers 
our conclusions.  
2. Theoretical underpinning 
2.1. The setting 
Like in most other European countries, GPs in Denmark are private entrepreneurs on contract with third-
party payers; that is, the Danish Regions. Collective agreements between GPs and the Danish Regions are 
bargained approximately every second year. The collective agreements define, among other things, 
organization of the remuneration system. GPs in Denmark are currently remunerated by capitation 
(approximately one third of their income) and fee-for-service (approximately two thirds of their income). 
For each consultation the GPs undertake, they are paid a fixed fee of 135.64 DKK (corresponding to 18.22 
EUR/22.96 USD as of October 2015). This is independent of the time spent on the consultation. During the 
consultation, the GP can provide non-contractible services such as advice regarding health problems, and 
contractible services including blood tests. The contractible efforts are reimbursed with a fixed fee per 
service undertaken.  
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All citizens in Denmark are automatically assigned a GP, and 87 percent of citizens visit their GP at least 
once per annum, with an average of seven contacts per year including e-mail and telephone consultations 
(Statistics Denmark 2011). There are no user fees for consulting a GP (consultations are free of charge), 
although some services must be paid for by the individual patient (for instance, vaccinations). However, 
access to primary care is rationed by barriers to entry since health care authorities decide the number of 
GPs given permission to practice, based on the number of Danish nationals. This, together with a structural 
shortage of GPs in Denmark, causes a scarcity in the supply of GP consultations  W especially in the rural 
areas of Denmark. Normally, a non-acute consultation lasts 10 W15 minutes.  
This study is based in the contemporary primary care setting as described above. In the experiment, GPs 
and patients were asked to choose their most and least preferred consultations that vary regarding the 
content of the consultation. This has several implications for the theoretical model and interpretation of 
our findings  W most importantly, it suggests ƚŚĂƚ'WƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŵŽĚĞůĞĚĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ
basis of the current remuneration system, with GPs facing an implicit time constraint.  
2.2. Agency theory in general practice 
According to neoclassical economic theory, agents and principals seek to maximize utility by acting in their 
own best interest. It is assumed that individuals have complete and fully ordered preferences and make 
rational choices that satisfy their preferences over other possible choices. In such a case, utility functions 
can be used to describe the preferences of the parties. In traditional labor economics, utility functions of 
employed agents consist, among other things, of wage and effort (Ashenfelter and Card 2010). We can 
develop this standard utility function to apply to remunerated agents in the health care sector, such as GPs. 
Accordingly, GPs derive utility from remuneration and disutility from effort. We focus on the patient W
doctor encounter described in terms of a consultation.  
Consider a model where the GP faces a choice of consultation from a set of mutually exclusive 
consultations. Effort, e, denotes a function of services provided during a consultation, X. In the definition 
by McGuire (2000), effort includes all actions the GP undertakes within the consultation, including medical 
actions and non-contractible efforts such as diligence, care, and attentiveness. Due to our focus in the 
empirical analysis, effort is restricted to non-contractible effort, such as time spent listening to the patienƚ ?Ɛ
problem, time used for reaching a shared decision, time for talking about other health-related issues, etc. 
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Hence, we define X as a vector of the non-contractible actions the GP undertakes during the consultation6. 
In line with McGuire (2000), time spent in the consultation is an implicit dimension of the services provided, 
and thus varies with X. As standard we assume that the patient derives utility from the actions undertaken 
by the GP. We define patient utility broadly allowing non-contractible effort to generate utility beyond 
direct health/treatment benefits through e.g. attentiveness and reassurance (Brouwer et al. 2008; Mooney 
and Ryan 1993). Let B ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƚƌƵĞ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚa consultation, and let B* 
represent the GW ?Ɛ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚthe consultation. Inspired by Ellis 
(1990), Ellis and McGuire (1986) and McClellan (1996), the GP incorporates the ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ perceived utility 
into his/her own utility function, denoted U (Evans 1984; Mooney and Ryan 1993). Furthermore we assume 
that ƚŚĞ'W ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨ consultation, and therefore intensity of services, is based on the trade-off between 
the opportunity cost (of effort and time) and the utility gained from treating the patient and is allowed to 
vary across GPs. Consequently the GPs are assumed to react to different motivational factors with different 
weights in their utility functions, such as placing more or less importance on perceived patient utility. We 
therefore introduce  as a relative weight on the trade-off between different motivational factors of the 
GP. Finally we assume that GPs are remunerated for the consultation with a fixed fee, p, which is 
independent of the choice of consultation (i.e. time and effort spent on the consultation). Correspondingly, 
the maximization problem of the GP for a consultation can be written as: 
(1)  ܯܽݔ܆ܷ ൌ ߙ൫݌ െ ݁ሺ܆ሻ൯ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻܤB?൫݁ሺ܆ሻ൯ǡߙ B?ሼ ?Ǣ  ?ሽǡ܆ B? ሺHܺ?ǡ ܺH?ǡ ǥ ǡ ܺH?ሻ 
where ܤB?ൌ ܤ ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞ'WŚĂƐƉĞƌĨĞĐƚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƵƚŝůŝƚǇĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?According to the 
model, equals 0 if the 'WŝƐƉƵƌĞůǇƵƐĞƌŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚĞĚĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐǁĞůůďĞŝŶŐ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐ
extreme case, the GP only derives positive utility from effort and does not take the opportunity costs into 
consideration7. Contrary, equals 1 if the GP does not gain any utility from the effort invested in the 
individual patient. In this extreme case the GP is motivated by other factors than user orientation and seek 
to minimize effort invested in the individual patient in order to maximize income and/or time for other 
patients. 
                                                          
6 Ellis (1990) defines X as intensity in services determined by patient type, whereas McClellan (1996) defines intensity 
of services as a dichotomous variable (less intensive and more intensive) that depends on the expected benefit to the 
patient. 
7 The opportunity cost of effort describes the time the GP could use on leisure activities and/or on treating other 
patients. The latter could be motivated by both personal financial incentives (as more consultations generate more 
income) and public service motivation (as the GP serves the joint interest of all patients; that is, society, by seeing 
more patients). 
D
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It is assumed that all variables are continuous and twice differentiable. Furthermore we assume that effort 
increases with actions undertaken in the consultation at an increasing rate, and that the perceived utility of 
patients increases with effort at a decreasing rate. Hence, assuming that ݁ሺ ࢏ܺሻ is separable in each action ࢏ܺwith ݅ A? ? ? ? ? ?n: 
(2)  ݁ᇱሺ ࢏ܺሻ ൐  ?Ǣ ᇱ݁ᇱሺ ࢏ܺሻ ൐  ?Ǣ ܤB?ᇱሺ݁ሻ ൐  ?Ǣ ܤB?ᇱB?ሺ݁ሻ ൏  ? 
The solution to the maximization problem in equation (1) is found by taking the first-order derivative of U  
with respect to ࢏ܺ. This entails that in optimality the marginal utility of increasing (perceived) patient utility 
equals the marginal utility of effort by performing one more task during the consultation. This is expressed 
in equation (3): 
(3)  ሺ ?-Ƚሻ  ?ȗ ?  ? ? ൌȽ  ? ?  
The model demonstrates the general trade-off the GP faces; more effort for a single patient (user 
orientation) entails an economic loss and thus a financial disincentive (in terms of lower payment per hour) 
and less time to consult with other patients (public service motivation), but also generates a positive effect 
from the perceived gain in utility for the individual patient (user orientation). How these effects are 
weighted against each other depends on the motivational factor . In the empirical analyses we estimate 
the utility associated with the non-contractible services provided during the consultation, X. Although our 
experimental setup does not allow us to estimate , we do obtain implicit knowledge on , and can 
distinguish between the extreme case (  = 0 and = 1) and the non-extreme case ߙ B? ሺ ?ǡ ?ሻ . In this 
regard our study complements the experimental findings by Godager and Wiesen (2013), where three 
groups with different alphas were identified. 
Our focus is on three interrelated research questions: (1) do GPs act as perfect agents for the patients? And 
if not, is this due to (2) asymmetric information and/or (3) deviations due to other motivational factors than 
user orientation as a result of their double agency? If GPs have incomplete information on ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?
ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞǇǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞĂďůĞƚŽĐŽƌƌĞĐƚůǇƚĂŬĞĂĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ, even if they have the 
intention to do so (that is, D < 1) ?KŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ?'WƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞĨƵůůǇĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĨŽƌ
consultations, but decide (partly) not to act accordingly, with the extreme case of D =1. Based on the 
model (equations 1 W3), we purport the following three hypotheses as a basis for the subsequent empirical 
analysis: 
D
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H1: Perfect agent hypothesis: The GP acts as a perfect agent for the patient if both of the following 
conditions are satisfied: 1) there is complete information (H2), and 2) the GP is purely user oriented (H3). 
This implies that ܷ ൌ ܤ.  
H2: Complete information hypothesis: The GP has complete information on the patient ?s preferences for 
the consultation, such that ܤ ൌ ܤB?. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for H1 to hold. 
H3: User orientation hypothesis: The GP is purely user oriented and does not take the opportunity cost of 
time and effort into consideration in the choice of consultation; that is, D = 0, and hence ܷ ൌ ܤB?. This is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for H1 to hold. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Survey design 
Choice experiments have been used extensively in health economics to study preferences for health and for 
(the delivery of) health care services (see e.g. Clark et al. 2014). Recently, related methods that extend 
design and modelling of the traditional choice experiment have gained terrain, including BW3 
experiments8. BW3 was introduced by Louviere et al. (2004)9, and first presented in the health economics 
literature by Lancsar et al. (2005)10. It has recently been axiomatized and theoretically developed by Marley 
and Louviere (2005) and Marley and Pihlens (2012). In BW3 experiments respondents are presented with a 
number of hypothetical scenarios each consisting of three or more alternatives differentiated by the 
attributes of interest and asked to choose both the best and the worst options available. The best and 
worst terms are subsequently used to define the extremes of a latent, subjective continuum (Louviere et al. 
2015). The BW3 experiment (as well as other best Wworst scaling methods) provides richer information on 
preferences compared to traditional choice experiments (which only obtain information on the most 
preferred option in a choice set), since a fuller preference order of respondents can be obtained (Flynn 
2010). This usually results in gains in statistical efficiency when maintaining the typical numbers of choice 
sets (Lancsar et al. 2013). DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ŽŶ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ? ǁŽƌƐƚ ĐĂƐĞ ƐĐĞnarios can be explicitly 
obtained. The BW3 model is the one that comes closest to traditional choice experiments entailing that the 
                                                          
8 Also referred to as a best Wworst discrete choice experiment (Lancsar et al. 2013; Lancsar and Louviere 2008) or best W
worst multi-profile case (Flynn and Marley 2012; Marley and Pihlens 2012). 
9 Later published in Louviere et al. (2008). 
10 Later published in Lancsar et al. (2007). 
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design of the scenarios in the BW3 experiment is similar to the experimental design of a traditional choice 
experiment, whereas the econometric modelling differs.  
We designed a BW3 experiment to elicit preferences for general practice consultations. We deliberately 
chose to model the meeting between the GP and the patient as this constitutes one of the most central 
meetings between health care providers and patients, and mimics an everyday situation in primary care. 
The experiment went through a thorough design phase. The attributes and levels, as well as the description 
of the choice situation, were carefully chosen on the basis of information gathered from: a literature review 
ŽĨ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ĨŽƌĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐŽĨ'WĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ  ?e.g., Cheraghi-Sohi et al. 
2008; Hjelmgren and Anell 2007; Scott and Vick 1999; Vedsted et al. 2002), visits to different general 
practices and observational studies of actual consultations, interviews with GPs and patients, and 
discussions with the Organisation of General Practitioners in Denmark. The final attributes included were: 
(1) time devoted to explaining the health care problem (problem), (2) discussion of possible treatments 
(treatment), (3) scheduling of follow-up visits (follow-up), (4) dialogue about topics other than the specific 
health problem (care), and ( ? ? ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ŐĞŶĞƌĂůhealth status and lifestyle (health 
status). The experiment was carefully designed to reflect the content of a standard practice consultation 
characterized by the specific steps GPs are trained to undertake in a normal (non-acute) consultation. The 
attributes were all unaffiliated with clinical diagnosis and specific treatment of the disease. Importantly, 
this obviates any disparities in preferences due to clinical considerations. Consequently, asymmetry of 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ůĂĐŬ ŽĨ ĐůŝŶŝĐĂů ŬŶŽǁledge cannot constitute an explanatory factor in our 
analysis (as opposed to previous studies (e.g., Hirth et al. 2000)). Table 1 provides an overview of attributes 
and levels as they were described for GPs and patients, respectively. All attributes are qualitatively 
described and assigned two levels each.  
[TABLE 1] 
As noted in Louviere and Lancsar (2009), traditional experimental designs can be used for BW3 
experiments. We used an optimal orthogonal in the differences design (OOD) with zero priors (Street and 
Burgess 2007) generated by means of the software Ngene provided by ChoiceMetrics (ChoiceMetrics 
2009). Eight choice tasks were created obtaining 100 percent D-optimality. To keep the questionnaire 
length at a minimum, avoid too many drop outs (specifically among GPs), and increase response rates, the 
design was blocked in two such that each respondent received four choice tasks. Blocking was performed 
by minimizing the average correlation between the blocking column and the attribute column.  
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Two questionnaires were constructed; one for the patient sample and one for the two GP samples (only 
differing with respect to the BW3 task). The patient questionnaire was initiated with a number of 
ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŽƌǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ƵƐĞŽĨĂŶĚƐatisfaction with their GP, and questions about 
preferences for consultations. GPs on the other hand were asked questions about their attitudes towards 
interaction with patients in the consultation. Prior to the choice task, all respondents were presented with 
a thoroughly described situation in which they were asked to imagine that, due to mild but fairly long-
lasting symptoms (headache and a sore throat), they (the patient) had made an appointment with the GP. 
The symptoms were described in general terms to keep the situation generic and to avoid leading the GPs 
to think in terms of specific diagnoses. Respondents were then asked to choose first their most preferred 
consultation from a choice of three types of consultations, and thereafter their least preferred 
consultation. In the sample of GPs answering on behalf of patients, GPs were asked to choose most and 
least preferred consultation according to what they believed the patient would have chosen. An example of 
the best Wworst choice tasks including scenario description as they were presented to the three samples is 
shown in Appendix A. Subsequent to the choice tasks, questions on the respondents ? ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
characteristics were included in the questionnaire. 
The patient questionnaire was tested in a cognitive interview (Jobe 2003), which led to minor changes. 
Afterwards, a web-based pilot study with 28 respondents, drawn as a convenience sample from the Danish 
population, was conducted. While answering the questionnaire, the respondents were encouraged three 
times to comment on the questionnaire and state if they felt something was missing. As none of the 
interviewees felt that important aspects had been omitted, it was concluded that all relevant attributes 
were included. The GP questionnaire was tested in three similar cognitive interviews with GPs from 
different general practices. The cognitive interviews led to several adjustments relating to the wording and 
options given in the questionnaire to make the questions realistic for the GPs, and in correspondence with 
the collective agreement. Afterwards, a paper based pilot study with seven GPs was conducted, which led 
to minor changes. None of the changes were related to the best Wworst scaling exercise. 
3.2. Data collection 
Patients (that is, members of the general public) were recruited in May 2010 from an Internet panel whose 
members received an e-mail with a link to the questionnaire. The target sample was a representative 
sample of 1400 respondents of the general public above 18 years of age, and the link was deactivated when 
the quota had been met. Inconsistent respondents, defined as respondents choosing the same alternative 
as best and worst, were removed from the data, and the representativeness of the remaining respondents 
 12 
 
was tested with respect to age, gender, and geography using t-tests for proportions applying a 5 percent 
significance level. As respondents had to fill in all choice questions before they could proceed in the 
questionnaire, no incomplete choice tasks were generated.  
The GP questionnaires were mailed to a random sample of 1822 GPs, corresponding to half of all GPs in 
Denmark, in September 2010. To avoid ordering and strategic bias, half of the sample received a 
questionnaire containing best Wworst choice tasks, where they were asked to act in accordance with their 
own preferences, while the other half were asked to choose best and worst consultations on behalf of a 
typical patient. The GPs were randomly allocated to the two types of surveys. One reminder was sent out 
during the data collection process, together with a copy of the questionnaire. After removing incomplete 
and inconsistent respondents, the representativeness of the GPs with respect to age, gender, and 
geography was tested using t tests for proportions on 5 percent significance levels. In addition, a test for 
successful randomization between the two samples was performed on the same variables. 
3.3. Sequential bestȂworst models  
Data was analyzed in a stepwise process to model how each step affected preference estimates and model 
fit across the samples. A sequential best Wworst approach was taken assuming that preferences were 
formed in congruence with the question order (i.e. best out of three options first, followed by worst out of 
the remaining two options). Yoo and Doiron (2013) showed how to model BW3 data in a latent class 
framework, whereas Lancsar et al. (2013) have demonstrated how to account for preference and scale 
heterogeneity between persons, assuming constant scale over best Wworst choices. This paper shows how 
to take account of within-person heterogeneity and heteroskedasticity; that is, allowing for differences in 
scale and utility within best Wworst choices assuming constant utility and scale between persons within the 
three samples. For all three samples (patients, GPs, and GPs acting on behalf of patients), we estimated 
four types of models in the following order: (1) a generic model where all coefficients across best Wworst 
stages are assumed to be equal, (2) a model with stage-specific scale parameters that takes within-person 
heteroskedasticity into account, (3) a model with stage-specific scale parameters and separate alternative 
specific constants (ASCs), and (4) a model with stage-specific coefficients that also takes within-person 
heterogeneity into account. The stepwise exploration, and the motivation for it, is described in detail 
below. Separate parameters are estimated for each sample (patients, GPs, and GPs acting on behalf of 
patients). For simplicity, the exposition below is based on the patient sample but is easily generalized to 
any sample. 
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All models are specified using a linear MNL model leading to the following deterministic utility function for 
patient n in choice task t and for alternative j, with ũсϭ͕͙͕ϯ: 
(4)    Hܸ?ǡH?ǡH?H?H?ൌ ߜH?H?H?൅ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟  
+ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟  
where ߜH?H?H? is the ASC for alternative j, where, for normalization, we set ߜH?ȁH?H?H?H?H? ൌ  ?. The five separate X 
variables can be grouped together into Xn,j,t and refer to the non-contractible actions the GP undertakes 
during the consultation where ߚ denotes the utility parameter  associated with each action. 
Ranked data can be expressed in an exploded logit formula. If respondents were asked to choose the best 
alternative from three options labeled A, B, and C followed by the worst alternative from the remaining two 
alternatives, then the probability of observing the ranking A > B > C for patient n in task t can be expressed 
as:  
(5)  
 
 Hܲ?ǡH?ሺܣ ൐ ܤ ൐ ܥሻ ൌ H?ೇ೙ǡಲǡ೟೛೟H?ೇ೙ǡಲǡ೟೛೟ H?H?ೇ೙ǡಳǡ೟೛೟ H?H?ೇ೙ǡ಴ǡ೟೛೟  ? H?షೇ೙ǡ಴ǡ೟೛೟H?షೇ೙ǡಳǡ೟೛೟ H?H?షೇ೙ǡ಴ǡ೟೛೟  
This is the product of two logit probabilities; that is, decomposing the ranking into two sequential choices. 
We first have the probability of respondent n choosing alternative A as the best alternative out of 
alternatives A, B and C. This leaves the choice of alternative C as being the worst out of alternatives B and 
C. This can be expressed as a binary logit probability, using the negatives of the utilities to reflect the fact 
that this is now the choice of the alternative with the lowest utility (rather than the highest). This is the 
generic best Wworst model (Model 1), where scale and utility coefficients are assumed to be equal across 
best and worst stages (Louviere et al. 2015).  
Flynn and Marley (2012) has pointed to an increasing amount of evidence suggesting that the variance of 
the error term is often not equal for best and worst data. This may be due to respondents being more 
consistent in worst (or best) choices, implying smaller error variance and larger estimates in absolute size 
compared to best (or worst) choices. To overcome potential bias in estimation, Louviere et al. (2015) and 
Flynn and Marley (2012) recommend estimating this term. In Model 2, the assumption about equal scale is 
therefore relaxed and heteroskedasticity across the two choice tasks is taken into account, and we use:  
(6)  Hܲ?ǡH?ሺܣ ൐ ܤ ൐ ܥሻ ൌ H?ഋ್ೇ೙ǡಲǡ೟೛೟H?ഋ್ೇ೙ǡಲǡ೟೛೟ H?H?ഋ್ೇ೙ǡಳǡ೟೛೟ H?H?ഋ್ೇ೙ǡ಴ǡ೟೛೟  ? H?షഋೢೇ೙ǡ಴ǡ೟೛೟H?షഋೢೇ೙ǡಳǡ೟೛೟ H?H?షഋೢೇ೙ǡ಴ǡ೟೛೟  
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where ߤH? and ߤH? are the scale parameters for the best and worst choices, respectively, where we 
normalize the scale to 1 for the best choice ( bP ) for identification reasons.  
Model 3 allows for separate ASCs for best and worst choices. If the distribution of best frequencies differs 
significantly from the distribution of worst frequencies, the constant terms will differ. This was pointed out 
by Flynn et al. (2007) for best Wworst scaling case 2, and is seen in our data sets to also apply to BW3 
models.  
We therefore now create two separate utility functions as: 
(7)  Hܸ?ǡH?ǡH?ǡH?H?H?H?H?H? ൌ ߜH?ǡ H?H?H?H?H? ൅ ߚH?H?ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟  ൅ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟  
and 
(8)   Hܸ?ǡH?ǡH?ǡH?H?H?H?H?H?H? ൌ ߜH?ǡH?H?H?H?H?H?H? ൅ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?H?H?ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟  
We still have stage specific scale parameters and the choice probability for the A>B>C ranking is now given 
by: 
(9) Hܲ?ǡH?ሺܣ ൐ ܤ ൐ ܥሻ ൌ H?ഋ್ೇ೙ǡಲǡ೟೛೟ ǡH?H?H?H?H?ഋ್ೇ೙ǡಲǡ೟ǡ್೐ೞ೟೛೟ H?H?ഋ್ೇ೙ǡಳǡ೟೛೟ ǡH?H?H?H?H?ഋ್ೇ೙ǡ಴ǡ೟೛೟ ǡH?H?H?H? ? H?షഋೢೇ೙ǡ಴ǡ೟ǡೢ೚ೝೞ೟೛೟H?షഋೢೇ೙ǡಳǡ೟೛೟ ǡH?H?H?H?H?H?H?షഋೢೇ೙ǡ಴ǡ೟೛೟ ǡH?H?H?H?H? 
Louviere et al. (2015) point out that it may be naïve and misleading to assume that best and worst choices 
reflect mirror image values due to potential differences in decision rules in best and worst choices, and 
Giergiczny et al. (2013) show that this is indeed the case. Hence, Model 4 allows for within-person 
heterogeneity given relaxing of the assumption that the utility of choosing an option as worst is the exact 
negative of the utility of choosing it as best. This is the same as allowing utility coefficients to be stage 
specific (that is, estimating MNL models for each stage). We then have: 
(10)  Hܸ?ǡH?ǡH?ǡH?H?H?H?H?H? ൌ ߜH?ǡ H?H?H?H?H? ൅ ߚ ್೐ೞ೟H?H?ܺ H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?್೐ೞ೟H?H?ܺ H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟  ൅ߚH?್೐ೞ೟H?H?ܺ H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?್೐ೞ೟H?H?ܺ H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?್೐ೞ೟H?H?ܺ H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟  
and 
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(11)   Hܸ?ǡH?ǡH?ǡH?H?H?H?H?H?H? ൌ ߜH?ǡH?H?H?H?H?H?H? ൅ ߚH?ೢ೚ೝೞ೟H?H? ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?ೢ೚ೝೞ೟H?H? ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟  ൅ߚH?ೢ೚ೝೞ೟H?H? Hܺ?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?ೢ೚ೝೞ೟H?H? ܺH?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟ ൅ ߚH?ೢ೚ೝೞ೟H?H? ܺH?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?H?೙ǡೕǡ೟  
 
The full set of stage specific parameters now directly allow for scale differences, and we no longer need an 
additional scale parameter, such that the choice probability for the A>B>C ranking is now given by: 
(12) Hܲ?ǡH?ሺܣ ൐ ܤ ൐ ܥሻ ൌ H?ೇ೙ǡಲǡ೟ǡ್೐ೞ೟H?ೇ೙ǡಲǡ೟ǡ್೐ೞ೟H?H?ೇ೙ǡಳǡ೟ǡ್೐ೞ೟H?H?ೇ೙ǡ಴ǡ೟ǡ್೐ೞ೟  ? H?షೇ೙ǡ಴ǡ೟ǡೢ೚ೝೞ೟H?షೇ೙ǡಳǡ೟ǡೢ೚ೝೞ೟H?H?షೇ೙ǡ಴ǡ೟ǡೢ೚ೝೞ೟ 
All models were estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level to account for the 
panel structure of the data.  
The different model specifications were tested against each other using log-likelihood (LL) ratio tests. For 
the patient sample, the stepwise exploration showed statistical significant improvements in model fit for 
each step, with the greatest improvement with the introduction of separate ASCs (Model 3). For the GP 
sample and the sample of GPs answering on behalf of patients, no statistical significant improvements in fit 
were found from Model 1 to Model 2 (the scale parameter was insignificant), while Model 3 was found to 
be superior to Model 2, and Model 4 was superior to Model 3 in both samples. Hence, in the GP samples, 
within-person heterogeneity was the main driver for statistical superiority of Model 4, while the presence 
of both within-person heteroskedasticity and heterogeneity made Model 4 most appropriate for the 
patient sample. Importantly, however, main results are robust across the different specifications, and we 
therefore decided in the subsequent analysis to focus on Model 4 taking both within-person 
heteroskedasticity and heterogeneity into account. Other results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
3.4. Hypotheses to be tested 
We set out to empirically test the theoretical model described in terms of the three hypotheses previously 
outlined. We elicited preferences for the non-contractible effort vector, X, defined in terms of the five 
attributes displayed in equation (10) and (11) and Table 1. All three null hypotheses were tested using the 
LL ratio test on equality in utility parameters while controlling for differences in scale parameters across 
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samples (Swait and Louviere 1993)11. In the following, let vector ࢼ ൌ ൫ߜH?ǡ ߚH?ǡǥߚH?൯ represent the utility 
parameters of the attribute variables as depicted in the above equations. Furthermore letࢼH?H?, ࢼH?H? and ࢼH?H? ?H?H?represent the vector of the utility parameters of the three samples respectively (patients, GPs and 
GPs answering on behalf of patients). 
For H1 (Perfect agent hypothesis) we tested the following null hypothesis for best and worst choices 
respectively:  
(13)  H?H?ǣ ሺࢼH?H?െ ࢼH?H?ሻ ൌ  ?  
1
0H  will be rejected if GPs and patients differ systematically in their choices of best and worst 
consultations. Accordingly, a rejection of 10H  entails that GPs do not act as perfect agents for their patients. 
Whether this disparity is attributed to information asymmetry and/or caused by over motivations was 
further tested in H2 and H3.  
For H2 (Complete information hypothesis), we tested the following null hypothesis: 
(14) H?H?ǣ ሺࢼH?H?െ ࢼH?H? ?H?H?ሻ ൌ  ? 
2
0H  will be ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚŝĨƚŚĞ'WƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐŽĨďĞƐƚĂŶĚǁŽƌƐƚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŚĞŶĂŶƐǁĞƌŝŶŐŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨ the 
patient differ significantly from the ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ? This entails that asymmetric information between 
GPs and patients is present, implying that GPs are not able to correctly take account of patients ? 
preferences even if they intend to do so (that is, 1D ).  
Finally, H3 (User orientation hypothesis) was tested against the following null hypothesis:  
(15)  H?H?ǣ ሺࢼH?H?െ ࢼH?H? ?H?H?ሻ ൌ  ?  
3
0H  will be ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚŝĨƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐĨŽƌ'WƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐŽĨĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŚĞŶĂŶƐǁĞƌŝŶŐŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨ
ƚŚĞ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ĚŝĨĨĞƌ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ĨƌŽŵ 'WƐ ?ŽǁŶĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ. Thus, if 30H  is rejected this will entail that D > 0, 
implying that GPs take factors other ƚŚĂŶ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ŝŶƚŽ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ŽĨ
consultation. This suggests that GPs refrain from acting as perfect agents due to other motivational factors, 
such as opportunity costs of time and effort and economic benefits.  
                                                          
11 More specifically, the LL test is conducted using the following formula: )1()),((2 221  kLLLLLL FP , where PLL is the 
log likelihood estimate from the pooled model allowing for differences in scale, LL1 and LL2 is the log likelihood 
estimates for the separate models, and k is the number of parameters (Swait and Louviere 1993). 
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In addition to the overall testing of the hypotheses, we explored possible discrepancies in utility 
parameters across samples by performing pairwise comparisons of attribute estimates. This was done via 
graphical explorations of patterns in rank orders and overlap in confidence intervals within samples. Since it 
is not possible to compare the absolute size of utility coefficients across samples due to differences in 
scaling (Train 2003), we calculated standardized relative importance scores with the most important 
attribute set at 1.00. This approach is widely used in the health economics literature (e.g. Wijnen et al. 
2015; Hauber et al. 2009). Supplementary, to test for the influence of particular attributes on overall 
differences across samples, we calculated marginal rate of substitution (MRS) matrices for all possible 
combinations of attributes and tested for statistical significant differences in MRS across samples using t 
tests (results are available upon request).   
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptives 
A total of 1435 respondents from the Danish population answered the patient questionnaire. After removal 
of inconsistent respondents, the final sample consists of 1379 respondents. The patient sample is 
representative on gender and geography, while young respondents aged 18 W29 years are overrepresented 
(p=0.0000), and respondents aged 40 W49 years and 60+ are underrepresented (p=0.0311 and p=0.0000, 
respectively). The characteristics of the study population as well as tests for representativeness are 
presented in Appendix B.  
Of the 1822 distributed questionnaires to GPs, 969 were returned, resulting in a response rate of 53 
percent. In total, 491 GPs answered the questionnaire on behalf of themselves, while 478 answered on 
behalf of the patients. After removal of incomplete and inconsistent respondents, the final sample consists 
of 384 GPs answering on behalf of themselves and 391 GPs answering on behalf of the patients. An 
overview of incomplete and inconsistent respondents is provided in Appendix C. The sample of GPs is 
representative with respect to gender, age, and region, except that there are slightly more GPs in the 
sample from the Central Denmark Region (p=0.025) and slightly less from Region Zealand (p=0.023). The 
characteristics of the study population as well as tests for representativeness are presented in Appendix B. 
Randomization of the two samples of GPs is deemed successful since the samples are similar on all 
variables, except that in the GP sample there are slightly more GPs from the Capital Region of Denmark 
(p=0.022).  
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4.2. Regression results 
Table 2 shows the results from the BW3 models (Model 4). For best choices, all attributes have the same 
signs across samples and are statistically significant (except for the health status attribute in the GP 
sample). Interestingly, the utility for follow-up visits is negative for all three samples, and is consistently 
ranked as least important. For worst choices signs are also similar across samples, except for the follow-up 
for patients, which is negative but insignificant. It should be noted that the larger standard errors and 
thereby confidence intervals in the GP samples are presumably due to the smaller sample sizes compared 
to the patient sample.  
[TABLE 2] 
H1: Perfect agent hypothesis 
Based on the results from the LL test for equality in utility parameters we reject the null hypothesis of 
similar preference patterns for GPs and patients (statistical value = 120.30 vs. critical chi-square value of 
24.996). Hence, H1 (that ܷ ൌ ܤሻ is rejected at the overall level, entailing that we cannot confirm that GPs 
are perfect agents for the patients. 
To explore these findings further, Figure 1 shows the rank order of the attributes and the confidence 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀĂůƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐ ĨŽƌ ďĞƐƚ ĂŶĚ ǁŽƌƐƚ ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ 'WƐ ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƐĞĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ 'WƐ ?
preferences for best consultations are markedly different to ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ĨŽƌďĞƐƚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
GPs value shared decision-making on treatment (treatment_best) and proper time to explain the problem 
(problem_best) significantly more than the other attributes. Patients, on the other hand, value discussions 
about their health status and lifestyle (health status_best) most, closely followed by time devoted to 
explaining the problem (problem_best) and making shared decisions on treatment (treatment_best). Our 
results demonstrate that GPs do not act as perfect agents for patients in all aspects of the consultation, 
corresponding with the rejection of H1 from the LL test.  
Furthermore, we found discrepancies in preferences to be largest in choice of best consultations. In choices 
of worst consultations, rank orders seem to follow the same pattern across the two samples. Both GPs and 
patients find a consultation where they do not talk about health status and lifestyle (health status _worst), 
and where shared decision-making does not take place (treatment_worst) as the worst (although the latter 
is more pronounced in the GP sample). This suggests that patients and GPs share a common understanding 
of what characterizes a bad consultation (that is, what should not be ignored), but that preferences are 
more dispersed when it comes to defining a good consultation.  
[FIGURE 1] 
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H2: Complete information hypothesis 
Based on the test statistics from the LL test between patients, and GPs answering on behalf of patients, we 
reject the null hypothesis of equality in utility parameters between the two samples (statistical value = 
77.78 vs. critical chi-square value of 24.996). Hence, H2 (that ܤ ൌ ܤB?ሻcan be rejected at the overall level, 
indicating that asymmetric information exists and that 'WƐ ŚĂǀĞ ŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?
preferences. 
&ŝŐƵƌĞ ?ƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚ'WƐŵĂŶĂŐĞƚŽŐĞƚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƌĂŶŬŽƌĚĞƌƌŝŐŚƚĨŽƌĂůůĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐĞǆĐĞƉƚĨŽƌƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?
most important attribute. Thus, our results seem to indicate that GPs predominantly ŬŶŽǁ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?
preferences for consultations ? ďƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ŵŽƐƚ
preferred aspect in the consultation; that is, talking about health status and lifestyle. The fact that GPs 
underestimate the value for patients of being asked about general health status is found to be the main 
reason for the overall rejection of H2.12 Our results demonstrate that even if GPs are purely user oriented, 
ƚĂŬŝŶŐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶƚŽĂĐcount ( = 0), they are not fully capable of acting as perfect agents due 
to uncertainty about preferences. Notably, this discrepancy is not observed in the assessment of 
preferences for worst consultation, where GPs are aware that the worst consultation for patients is one in 
which patients are not asked about health status and lifestyle.  
 [FIGURE 2] 
H3: User orientation hypothesis 
Given the results of the LL test, we reject the null hypothesis of overall equality in utility parameters 
between GPs and GPs answering on behalf of patients, implying that GPs ? perceptions of patient 
preferences significantly differ from their own preferences (statistical value = 76.10 vs. critical chi-square 
value of 24.996). This entails that H3 (that ܷ ൌ ܤB?ሻ is rejected and henceforth 0!D . This indicates that 
GPs deviate from being a perfect agent for the patients (independently of any asymmetric information that 
might be present) as a response to other motivational factors such as financial incentives and public service 
motivation (captured in the model as increasing opportunity costs in effort invested in the individual 
patient). 
Figure 3 shows that best choices especially differ with respect to time for explaining the problem 
(problem_best) and reaching a shared decision on treatment (treatment_best). These are reversed in rank 
                                                          
12 This was tested by calculating MRS matrices for all possible combinations of attributes and testing for statistical 
significant differences in MRS across samples using t-tests.   
D
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order between the two samples, constituting the main explanation for the rejection of H3.13 For worst 
choices, there are also some notable differences. This is especially pronounced for the shared decision-
making attribute (treatment_worst), which GPs value more strongly than their patients, according to their 
perception.  
 [FIGURE 3] 
5. Discussion 
Our ƐƚƵĚǇĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚt ?ĐĂŶƉƌŽǀŝĚĞǀĂůƵĂďůĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶ'WƐ ?ĂŶĚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?preferences. The 
use of BW3 was chosen over traditional choice experiments to obtain more preference information. This 
was an important argument as we were constrained in the questionnaire length to the GPs. Furthermore 
additional insights into individual decision processes were obtained, as BW3 allows us to compare 
differences between best and worst choices. Having information on which characteristics are important 
when choosing the best consultation is naturally relevant. In our setting the information gathered from 
worst choices add some further insights on the utility functions of GPs and patients. This is valuable 
information in identifying attribute levels that make the good or service - in our case a consultation  W 
(un)acceptable (Flynn and Marley 2012). BW3 thus provides health care decision makers with additional 
information about which characteristics that should not be ignored during a consultation. According to our 
results we see a slight discrepancy in the relative importance of best and worst consultations most notably 
for GPs, implying that best and worst preferences are not perfectly inversely correlated. This is most 
pronounced for the attribute  ?health status and life style ?. In contrast to worst choices, asking about health 
status is not deemed particularly important in best choices. Our results thus seem to suggest that GPs 
acknowledge that a conversation about health status and lifestyle is important and should ideally not be 
ignored. Nevertheless they still choose not to prioritize this as part of their preferred consultation. This 
discrepancy could be driven by time constraints (public service motivation), lack of financial incentives, 
paternalism, and/or a (mistaken) belief that patients consider this part of the consultation less relevant 
(asymmetric information). Our results suggest that the latter bears some explanatory power and that the 
GPs ? agency role can be improved through ensuring greater information dissemination of patients ? 
preferences to GPs. From a policy perspective, this finding is especially relevant in light of increased 
attention on the future role(s) of the GP in health prevention and health promotion. 
                                                          
13 This was tested by calculating MRS matrices for all possible combinations of attributes and testing for statistical 
significant differences in MRS across samples using t-test.   
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According to our theoretical model, the observation that GPs do not prioritize time for explaining the 
problem and thuƐĚĞǀŝĂƚĞĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇďĞůŝĞǀĞŝƐŝŶƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ may be explained by 
considerations for the joint interest of other patients and/or the design of the current remuneration 
system. By shortening the consultation, there will be more time to see other patients and, at the same 
time, increase payment per hour. This suggests that GPs  W at least in some situations  W take the opportunity 
cost of time into account and ĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇĚĞĐŝĚĞŶŽƚƚŽŵĞĞƚƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐǁŝƐŚĞƐ ? According to our 
findings it thus seems that GPs take both principals ? ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ into consideration in their choice of 
consultation trying to optimize the use of their resources by avoiding long and inefficient consultations. 
However, our results could also be interpreted to support models of supplier-induced demand (SID) arguing 
that GPs use their superior information to deliberately (and at a cost of the individual patient) deviate from 
optimality (McGuire 2000). Unfortunately we are not able to distinguish between the different motivational 
factors included in  and therefore not whether GPs refrain from being perfect agents as to increase own 
earnings (as assumed in SID) or  due to the consideration of other patients, just as we are not able to 
determine the size of , never mind the optimal size of D . Although a few papers have addressed this 
topic (see e.g., Godager and Wiesen 2013; Pedersen et al. 2014), more research on this trade-off is 
warranted. Nonetheless, the fact that GPs seem to act as agents for both principals (i.e. the individual 
patient and the collective entity), thereby weighing their interests, is in itself an interesting finding which 
suggests that primary care providers are responsive to changes in these motivational factors. This implies 
that multi-pronged strategies targeting different motivational drivers of the GPs could be considered a 
relevant tool in areas where patient centered health care delivery is warranted.   
In our theoretical model, it is the ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƵƚŝůŝƚǇ - and not health gains more narrowly defined - that enters 
into the GP ?s utility function (Mooney and Ryan 1993). This approach was chosen as our experiment 
focuses on the communication between GP and patient in a consultation more generally. Furthermore, 
describing a ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŐĂŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƵƚŝůŝƚǇis in line with the welfarism approach in neoclassical economic 
theory (Brouwer et al. 2008), and accords with the European definition of the discipline of general 
practice14. Also, as noted by McKinstry (1992), paternalism is rarely justified when treating patients of 
sound mind. If GPs take a more paternalistic view and more narrowly consider a ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ health outcome, 
this could drive a wedge between elicited preferences of GPs and patients. In such a case the divergence in 
preferences should center on attributes with less clinical relevance. Our result that GPs find the attributes 
 ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ĂŶĚ ?ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ? most important indicate that GPs mainly focus on aspects related to the specific 
                                                          
14 According to the European definition of general practice, a characteristic of the discipline is that GPs should take a 
holistic view of the patient treating health problems in their physical, psychological, social, cultural and existential 
dimensions  Hence part of the treatment in general practice also includes talking to, comforting and soothing patients. 
D
D
 22 
 
health problem before concentrating on early detection and prevention of lifestyle diseases, whereas 
patients themselves focus on general health status and lifestyle before the particular health problem. If GPs 
consider  ?talking about health status and life style ? of low value in terms of improving patient ?s health 
relative to the opportunity costs, then not prioritising this during the consultation could be based on a 
legitimate judgement. Furthermore it should be noted that our choice scenario was described as a choice 
between different types of consultations not involving direct treatment decisions. This allowed us to 
assume one-sided asymmetric information hereby eliminating asymmetric information on clinical 
knowledge. Unfortunately we are not able to empirically verify the potential extent to which some 
consultations were considered more appropriate than others from a clinical perspective (potentially 
causing non-alignment in preferences). Future studies that investigate whether this type of study design is 
appropriate in eliminating one side of the asymmetric information are warranted.  
To examine whether our results differ across a range of subsamples of GPs and patients, we estimated 
models for (1) frequent visitors in general practice (patients having three or more consultations per year) to 
examine differences in preference patterns across patient groups15; (2) male vs. female GPs to test for 
gender differences in motivational factors and information asymmetry, and; (3) old vs. young GPs to see 
whether years of experience affect the results. Overall, we were not able to detect any differences in 
preference patterns according to the subgroup analyses. Our results thus seem to be robust within 
different subsamples of GPs and patients. Moreover, our conclusions are also robust within different model 
specifications (Model 1-4). That there are no differences in preferences between subgroups of GPs and 
patients indicates limited (observable) preference heterogeneity between persons. Although we use cluster 
robust standard errors in the estimation, we do not allow for unobservable preference heterogeneity 
between persons. To further test the robustness of our results we also ran models allowing for both within- 
and between-person heterogeneity (we specified these models as mixed logit with all model parameters 
being normally distributed and with a full covariance matrix being estimated between them, and used 
Bayesian estimation). Importantly, overall conclusions were not affected by method used. This is in line 
with previous studies reaching the same conclusions on main effects regardless of model (Lancsar et al. 
2013, Louviere et al. 2015). Hence, for the purpose of this paper it was deemed sufficient to use models 
allowing for within-person heterogeneity (and heteroscedasticity) only.   
The interviewed GPs and the Organisation of General Practitioners in Denmark recommended sending out 
questionnaires by regular mail as this is more convenient for GPs and in accordance with their usual work 
                                                          
15 Patients with more visits will be overrepresented in general practice. Thus it is possible that the GPs when 
answering of behalf of the patients have based their decision on this group of patients.  
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procedures, and hence most likely to increase response rates. However, the paper based questionnaires 
allowed the GPs to proceed without completing all choice questions. A web-based survey format was 
chosen for the patient sample as this provides a cost-effective survey strategy for targeting the general 
population. In Denmark, 86 percent of the population has Internet access in their own homes (Statistics 
Denmark 2010), and coverage error is therefore not a major problem, although the prevalence of a panel 
effect cannot be excluded (Couper 2000). Empirical studies comparing results from paper-based and web-
based surveys find no differences in SP results (Banzhaf et al. 2006; Olsen 2009). However, in our study, the 
data collection procedure caused a number of inconsistent choices, where the same consultation approach 
was chosen as both best and worst. In an electronic survey, the alternative chosen as best could be 
removed in the subsequent choice of worst alternative amongst the remaining two alternatives (hereby 
imposing consistency in all responses), whereas in paper-based surveys this is not possible. Since there is 
no research yet on how the removal of the best alternative affects preference formation, we chose to use 
the same survey design across data-collection procedures, albeit this implies permitting inconsistent 
responses (which were subsequently removed). Marley and Louviere (2005) noted that best Wworst choice 
tasks seem easy for people to complete since they take advantage of ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ propensity to identify and 
respond more consistently to extreme options (Lancsar et al. 2013). However, based on our study, we 
cannot explain why some respondents make inconsistent choices (choosing the same alternative as the 
best and worst). Although some research has peripherally engaged in this (see, e.g., Giergiczny et al. 2013), 
more research is warranted.  
&ŽƌŽƵƌƌĞƐƵůƚƐƚŽďĞǀĂůŝĚŝŶĂƉŽůŝĐǇƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ?ǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚ'WƐ ?ĂŶĚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐĂƌĞ
comparable to real-life behavior. Across fields, studies on the predictive value of choice experiments (e.g. 
Araña and León 2013; Cameron et al. 2002; Carlsson and Martinsson 2001; Mark and Swait 2004; Ryan and 
Watson 2009) have shown the capability of adequately predicting actual decision behavior. In a recent 
review, Lanscar and Swait (2014) noted that the external validity of choice experiments is generally good 
(but under-researched), with some exceptions (e.g. Fifer, Rose and Greaves 2014; Krucien et al, 2015). In 
this study we do not include a cost attribute and do not estimate absolute values such as willingness to pay. 
Instead, our focus is on identifying differences in choice patterns (rankings) across samples.  We have no 
reason to believe that these observed differences should not reflect actual differences in preferences and 
beliefs. Furthermore, we need to assume that GPs understood the task and tried their best when answering 
on behalf of patients (thus disregarding own interests). As we observe differences across the two GP 
samples, while randomization was successful, we believe that this is the case.  
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Because patient and GP data could not be matched, it was not possible to identify which GPs serve which 
patients, and thus possible nonalignment of preferences may arise because of estimation at an aggregate 
and unmatched level. However, the 775 GPs included serve a fairly large fraction of approximately 20 
percent of the Danish population. Moreover, our subsample analyses show that our results are robust to 
subsample estimation. Hence, we have no reason to assume that preferences would change had we drawn 
another random sample of GPs or patients.  
In this paper, we have assumed that respondents make sequential choices for best and worst consultations. 
However, some persons could also have formed preferences for worst consultation before best, or decided 
on best and worst consultations simultaneously. We tested the decision rule of respondents by also 
performing analyses on sequential worst Wbest and simultaneous decisions and compared log likelihood 
estimates. For the majority of respondents, the sequential best Wworst decision rule had the best fit. 
However, more research is needed on decision behavior in best Wworst scaling experiments in the future 
(see also Giergiczny et al. 2013; Louviere et al. 2015; Rose 2014).  
6. Conclusions and implications 
Findings from this study extend the existing literature on the agency relationship by providing new insights 
into the understanding of the complex patient Wdoctor relationship and the potential underlying causes of 
nonalignment in preferences. We show that GPs do not act as perfect agents for patients in all aspects of 
the consultation. This is both due to ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂďŽƵƚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ (asymmetric information) in 
some aspects, and due to other motivations than user orientation in other aspects. This demonstrates that 
user orientation is not the sole (or perhaps even primary) motivational factor of the GPs, and that user 
orientation is likely to conflict with other motivations. Whether the observed deviations are caused by a 
concern for other patients (public service motivation), a personal financial interest, paternalism, or all of 
the above, remain unanswered. However, the finding that GPs seem to be responsive to different 
motivational factors highlights the need for considering other incentive mechanisms than just financial 
incentives in the endeavor of optimal delivery of primary health care services. Future studies that look 
further into these motivations and potential interactions between them are warranted. Finally we 
emphasize that GPs ? lack of knowledge on ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ is in itself problematic as it makes GPs 
unable to act in accordance with ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĞǀĞŶwhen they intend to do so. This information 
asymmetry can however be minimized by increasing information dissemination to GPs. This would optimize 
the agency relationship and increase utility for both GPs and patients. Nevertheless, the degree to which 
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GPs will act accordingly will ultimately ĚĞƉĞŶĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ 'WƐ ? ƚƌĂĚĞ-offs between different motivational 
factors. 
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Table 1. Attributes and levels for patients and GPs 
Attributes Levels (patients)a Levels (GPs)a 
Problem 
(1) The GP asks me to explain my 
problem in detail. I am given plenty 
of time to describe all symptoms and 
the discomforts I suffer in everyday 
life 
(0) The GP asks me to briefly explain 
what the problem is 
(1) I ask the patient to explain his/hers 
problem in detail. The patient gets 
plenty of time to describe all symptoms 
and the discomforts he/she suffers in 
everyday life 
(0) I ask the patient to briefly explain 
what the problem is 
Treatment 
(1) The GP discusses with me what 
the treatment options are, and 
which one would suit me best 
(0) The GP tells me what treatment I 
need 
(1) I discuss with the patient what the 
treatment options are, and which one 
would suit him/her best 
(0) I tell the patient what treatment 
he/she needs 
Follow-up 
(1) We set a new date for me to  
come back 
(0) The GP tells me to contact 
Śŝŵ ?ŚĞƌŝĨƚŚĞƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ
work 
(1) We set a new date for the patient to 
come back 
(0) I tell the patient to contact me if the 
ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ 
Care 
(1) The GP asks me whether there 
are other things that I want to talk 
about 
(0) 
(1) I ask the patient whether there are 
other things that he/she wants to talk 
about 
(0) 
Health status 
(1) The GP asks about my general 
health status and lifestyle 
(0) 
(1) /ĂƐŬĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŐĞŶĞƌĂů
health status and lifestyle 
(0) 
a Coding in parentheses.  
 32 
 
Table 2. Comparison between samples: Stage specific best-worst model 
 Patients GPs on behalf of patients GPs 
 Coeff. 
Robust  
std. error 
Coeff. 
Robust  
std. error 
Coeff. 
Robust  
std. error 
Problem_best 0.465 0.032 *** 0.869 0.070 *** 0.332 0.064 *** 
Treatment_best 0.411 0.039 *** 0.641 0.070 *** 0.634 0.066 *** 
Follow-up_best -0.176 0.039 *** -0.145 0.070 ** -0.255 0.065 *** 
Care_best 0.288 0.023 *** 0.486 0.048 *** 0.091 0.048 ** 
Health status_best 0.598 0.042 *** 0.365 0.082 *** 0.031 0.083  
ASC A_best -0.539 0.029 *** -0.469 0.060 *** -0.308 0.052 *** 
ASC B_best -0.370 0.028 *** -0.320 0.054 *** -0.207 0.049 *** 
Problem_worst 0.292 0.043 *** 0.411 0.085 *** 0.180 0.072 ** 
Treatment_worst 0.455 0.046 *** 0.378 0.081 *** 0.490 0.073 *** 
Follow-up_worst -0.074 0.045  0.074 0.079  0.043 0.072  
Care_worst 0.380 0.041 *** 0.315 0.090 *** 0.086 0.072  
Health status_worst 0.999 0.047 *** 0.865 0.088 *** 0.515 0.078 *** 
ASC A_worst 0.845 0.049 *** 0.813 0.095 *** 0.823 0.085 *** 
ASC B_worst 0.723 0.058 *** 0.595 0.106 *** 0.541 0.099 *** 
LL(0) -9883.35   -2802.31   -2752.14   
LL(Model) -8642.70   -2364.31   -2515.25   
Adjusted R2 0.1241   0.1513   0.0810   
n (choices) 5516   1564   1536   
N (respondents) 1379   391   384   
*** Statistically significant at the 0.001 level, ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
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Figure 1. H1: Perfect agent hypothesis 
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Figure 2. H2: Complete information hypothesis  
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Figure 3. H3: User orientation hypothesis 
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10. Appendix A 
Patient version:  
Imagine that you have an appointment with your GP due to a sore throat and headache. You have 
had pain for nearly 14 days and are not getting better. You have been very tired and unwell but 
ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚďĞĞŶŽĨĨwork sick/ill in bed. 
Which consultation would you, in the situation described, be most satisfied with, and which 
consultation would you be least satisfied with? 
Consultation 1 Consultation 2 Consultation 3 
The GP asks me to briefly 
explain what the problem is 
The GP asks me to briefly 
explain what the problem is 
The GP asks me to explain 
my problem in detail. I am 
given plenty of time to 
describe all symptoms and 
the discomforts I suffer in 
everyday life. 
The GP discusses with me 
what the treatment options 
are, and which one would 
suit me best 
The GP discusses with me 
what the treatment options 
are, and which one would 
suit me best 
The GP tells me what 
treatment I need 
We set a new date for me to 
come back 
We set a new date for me to 
come back 
The GP tells me to contact 
him/her if the treatment ǯ 
The GP asks me whether 
there are other things that I 
want to talk about 
The GP asks me whether 
there are other things that I 
want to talk about 
 
 
The GP asks about my 
general health status and 
lifestyle 
 
a. Which of the three consultations would satisfy you most? (Tick one box). 
 
 
b. Which of the three consultations would satisfy you least? (Tick one box). 
 
Consultation 1 
 
Consultation 2  

Consultation 3
 
Consultation 1 
 
Consultation 2  

Consultation 3
 
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GP version:  
Imagine that one of your patients has a non-acute appointment for a consultation at your clinic due 
to a sore throat and headache. The patient has had pain for nearly 14 days and is not getting better. 
The patient has been ǀĞƌǇƚŝƌĞĚĂŶĚƵŶǁĞůůďƵƚŚĂƐŶ ?ƚďĞĞŶŽĨĨǁŽƌŬƐŝĐŬ ?ŝůů ŶďĞĚ ? 
GPs on behalf of patient: Which of the three consultations do you think that the patient, in the 
situation described, would be most satisfied with, and which consultation would the patient be least 
satisfied with? 
GPs: Which of the three consultations would you, in the described situation, be most satisfied with, 
and which consultation would you be least satisfied with? 
Consultation 1 Consultation 2 Consultation 3 
I ask the patient to briefly 
explain what the problem is 
I ask the patient to briefly 
explain what the problem is 
I ask the patient to explain 
his/her problem in detail. 
The patient gets plenty of 
time to describe all 
symptoms and the 
discomforts he/she suffers in 
everyday life. 
I discuss with the patient 
what the treatment options 
are, and which one would 
suit him/her best 
I discuss with the patient 
what the treatment options 
are, and which one would 
suit him/her best 
I tell the patient what 
treatment he/she needs 
We set a new date for the 
patient to come back 
We set a new date for the 
patient to come back 
I tell the patient to contact ǯ
work 
I ask the patient whether 
there are other things that 
he/she wants to talk about 
I ask the patient whether 
there are other things that 
he/she wants to talk about 
 
 
ǯ
general health status and 
lifestyle 
 
a. GPs on behalf of patient: Which of the three consultations do you think would satisfy the 
patient most?  
GPs: Which of the three consultations would satisfy you most? (Tick one box). 
 
b. GPs on behalf of patient: Which of the three consultations do you think would satisfy the 
patient least? 
GPs: Which of the three consultations would satisfy you least? (Tick one box). 
 
Consultation 1 
 
Consultation 2  

Consultation 3
 
Consultation 1 
 
Consultation 2  

Consultation 3
 
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11. Appendix B 
Table 3. Characteristics of the study populations and tests for representativeness 
 Patients Danish population p-value 
 n % n %  
Gender      
Male 669 48.51% 2748185 49.57% 0.4317 
Female 710 51.49% 2795634 50.43% 0.4317 
Geography      
Capital Region of Denmark 398 28.88% 1687071 30.43% 0.2047 
Region Zealand 219 15.89% 820609 14.80% 0.2685 
Region of Southern Denmark 302 21.92% 1200841 21.66% 0.8191 
Central Denmark Region 305 22.13% 1255876 22.65% 0.6421 
Region of Northern Denmark 154 11.18% 579422 10.45% 0.3939 
Age      
18-29 437 31.85% 777655 17.96% 0.0000 
30-39 236 17.20% 737011 17.02% 0.8566 
40-49 228 16.62% 813591 18.79% 0.0311 
50-59 220 16.03% 714595 16.50% 0.6394 
60+ 251 18.29% 1288190 29.74% 0.0000 
      
 GPs GP population p-value 
 n % n %  
Gender      
Male 458 59.40% 2163 59.90% 0.7987 
Female 313 40.60% 1448 40.10% 0.7987 
Geography      
Capital Region of Denmark 231 29.96% 1094 30.30% 0.8538 
Region Zealand 88 11.41% 518 14.35% 0.0227 
Region of Southern Denmark 180 23.35% 810 22.43% 0.5850 
Central Denmark Region 209 27.11% 837 23.18% 0.0248 
Region of Northern Denmark 63 8.17% 352 9.75% 0.1532 
Age      
-34 1 0.13% 3 0.08% 0.7329 
35-39 34 4.44% 177 4.90% 0.5755 
40-44 81 10.57% 390 10.80% 0.8538 
45-49 114 14.88% 517 14.32% 0.6891 
50-54 139 18.15% 580 16.06% 0.1708 
55-59 180 23.50% 827 22.90% 0.7234 
60-64 159 20.76% 773 21.41% 0.6880 
65-69 55 7.18% 311 8.61% 0.1700 
70+ 3 0.39% 33 0.91% 0.0584 
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12. Appendic C 
Table 4. Incomplete and inconsistent respondents 
 Patients GPs on behalf GPs 
 n % n % n % 
Sample 1435  478  491  
Only incomplete 0 0.00% 33 6.90% 45 9.16% 
Only inconsistent 56 3.90% 5 1.05% 9 1.83% 
Both incomplete and inconsistent 0 0.00% 49 10.25% 53 10.79% 
Final sample 1379  391  384  
 
